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INTRODUCTION
Is it constitutional for states to prevent skilled workers with temporary
work visas from obtaining professional licenses? The Circuit Courts of
Appeal have reached different answers.
In the 2012 case Dandamudi v. Tisch, the Second Circuit ruled that a
New York law which prevents “nonimmigrants,” a broad term describing
aliens legally in the United States on a temporary basis, from receiving a
license to practice pharmacy was unconstitutional as applied to certain
skilled immigrants present in the United States on temporary visas.1 The
Second Circuit’s opinion explicitly rejected a 2005 Fifth Circuit decision,
LeClerc v. Webb, which affirmed the constitutionality of a Louisiana
Supreme Court rule that prohibited all nonimmigrants, including skilled
guest workers, from sitting for Louisiana’s bar exam.2
1. Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2012). The decision overruled § 6805
(1)(6) of New York’s Education Law. Compare id. with N.Y. Educ. Law § 6805 (2009).
The plaintiffs in the case had obtained licenses under a waiver to the requirement, but the
waiver program ended in 2009. Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 69. Other New York statutes
attempted to do the same thing in other fields. For example, veterinary licenses were
restricted to citizens and permanent residents. N.Y. Educ. Law § 6704 (6) (2007). That law
was also held to violate the Equal Protection Clause and Supremacy Clause. Kirk v. New
York State Dept. of Educ., 562 F. Supp. 2d 405, 405 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). It is important to
note that Dandamudi was an ‘as applied’ challenge to the New York statute, as opposed to a
facial challenge, as is clear from the lower court decision on appeal before the Second
Circuit. Adusumelli v. Steiner, 740 F. Supp. 2d 582, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
2. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005). The rule in question stated at the
time of the suit: “[e]very applicant for admission to the Bar of this state shall . . . [b]e a
citizen of the United States or a resident alien thereof.” Id. at 410. The rule “effectively
prohibit[ed] . . . nonimmigrant aliens who are not entitled to live and work in the United
States permanently from sitting for the Louisiana Bar.” Id. The rule was revised in 2009 to
allow those authorized to work in the United States to sit for the exam. Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule
17 § (3)(b), 8 L.S.A. – R.S. The question of whether the rule was permissible to begin with
remains open. Outside of the employment law context, the Sixth Circuit declined to strike
down a Tennessee law that prevented nonimmigrant aliens from obtaining drivers licenses.
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2007). The court
relied on many of the arguments adopted by the majority in the LeClerc decision in reaching
its decision. Id. at 532-33. These cases continue to influence other courts addressing
questions regarding state laws that affect aliens. See, e.g., Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer,
No. CV12–02546 PHX DGC., 2013 WL 2128315, at *12 (D. Ariz. May 16, 2013)
(discussing LeClerc v. Webb and League of United Latin American Citizens v. Bredesen and
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The ultimate resolution of the split will help define the constitutional
rights of skilled guest workers, who play an important role in the U.S.
economy and whose ranks are likely to grow if and when Congress adopts
immigration reform legislation. It will also open or close an avenue for
opponents of the skilled guest worker program to influence policy at the
state level. This comment argues that the Second Circuit was correct in
rejecting the New York law as applied. State laws that discriminate against
nonimmigrants violate the Equal Protection Clause and are preempted by
the Immigration and Nationality Act when they are used to discriminate
against skilled workers who are present in the United States on temporary
work visas.
This Comment begins by exploring the skilled guest worker program
in the United States. In part II, it considers whether state licensure bans
targeting these workers violate the Equal Protection Supremacy Clauses.
The comment concludes by proposing a legislative solution to the problem.
I.

THE SKILLED GUEST WORKER PROGRAM

A. Exploring the Immigration Status of Skilled Guest Workers
“Nonimmigrant” is a broad term that encompasses people holding
dozens of different types of visas.3 Nonimmigrants are individuals
admitted to the United States for a limited time to achieve a specific
purpose, such as studying, working temporarily, conducting business, or
simply touring the country.4 Skilled guest workers are but one subset of
individuals under the nonimmigrant umbrella. Many skilled guest workers
hold H1-B visas, which cover people coming to the United States to
perform services in a “specialty occupation.”5 H1-B visas expire after three
years, but can be extended to six. A specialty occupation is defined by
federal statute as one that requires the “theoretical and practical application
of a body of highly specialized knowledge”, and “attainment of a

their relevance).
3. The H1-B visa is one of dozens of different visa types that fall under the
nonimmigrant category. Nonimmigrants holding other types of visas, such as H2-A and
H2-B workers, also play an important role in the U.S. economy. However, many of the
plaintiffs in LeClerc and Dandamudi held H1-B visas, making it the focus of this Comment.
For a list of the various types of visas falling under the nonimmigrant heading, see 22 C.F.R.
§ 41.12, available at http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/22CFR/HTML/22CFR/0-0-0-1/00-0-500/0-0-0-669.html.
4. STEPHEN LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 344 (4th ed.
2005).
5. Id. There are other visa types that skilled guest workers might use to come to the
US. The North American Free Trade Agreement led to the creation of some other types of
visas, for example. See supra note 3, for a catalog of nonimmigrant visas.
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bachelor’s or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a
minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.”6 Potential
H1-B visa recipients can qualify in four ways: possession of (1) a U.S.
bachelors or higher degree required by the specialty occupation, (2) an
equivalent foreign degree, (3) an unrestricted state license to fully practice
a specialty occupation, or (4) specialized training or experience equivalent
to a U.S. degree along with work experience.7
Potential H1-B recipients must also affirm that they intend to depart
the U.S. at the end of their visa’s duration, as long as it is not extended.
The potential recipient’s “intent to leave,” however, is not subject to
verification by enforcement officials because of the concept of “dual
intent.” Dual intent allows H1-B visa holders to pursue permanent green
cards while in the US on their temporary visa. This means, for example,
that entrants on H1-B visas are not required to maintain residences abroad
while in the United States.8
U.S. employers also play an important role in the H1-B process as
petitions require employer sponsorship,9 and the sponsoring employer must
pay a fee to the government.10 Furthermore, the employer must verify that
the petitioner they are sponsoring will receive the prevailing wage and
working conditions afforded to similar employees in the employer’s
industry.11 An applicant cannot receive a visa if there is a labor dispute
with existing employees at the sponsoring employer’s company, such as a
strike or lockout.12 Furthermore, the employer may face financial penalties
and a suspension of sponsorship ability should they be involved in a
fraudulent petition.13
The number of H1-B visas is capped at 65,000 per fiscal year, with an
additional 20,000 visas granted to graduates of U.S. technical schools.14
This ceiling stands as a bar to many potential immigrants. In 2009, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) received 163,000 petitions for
H1-B visas—well above the cap.15 Indeed, the overload of petitions has
reached the point that CIS proposed a rule that would create a waitlist to
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1184 (i)(3)(A), (B) (2012).
7. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2 (h)(4)(iii)(C). See also RICHARD STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION
LAW, § 3:14 (2d ed. 2012) (explaining qualification requirements).
8. Austin T. Fragomen et al., Requirements for H-1B classification—Nonimmigrant
intent exemption, 1 IMMIGR. LAW & BUS., § 6:6, (2d ed. 2012).
9. Id. at § 6:12.
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1184 (c)(9)(A) (2012).
11. Fragomen, supra note 8, at § 6:9.
12. Id.
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1184 (c)(14)(A) (2012).
14. H-1B
Fiscal
Year
(FY)
2014
Cap
Season,
U.S.
C.I.S.,
http://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/temporary-workers/h-1b-specialty-occupationsand-fashion-models/h-1b-fiscal-year-fy-2014-cap-season (last visited Dec. 31, 2013).
15. Fragomen, supra note 8, at § 6:8.

2014]

PROFESSIONAL LICENSES

635

avoid problems when the cap is reached on the first day petitions can be
filed.16
B. The Policy Behind the Guest Worker Program
As a policy matter, H1-B and other temporary work visa programs are
supported because employers claim that they cannot find suitable domesticresident candidates for open positions.17 Foreign workers play an important
role in industries such as the high tech sector, where graduates with
science, technology, math and engineering backgrounds (STEM
backgrounds) are in high demand. Anecdotally, foreign-born entrepreneurs
founded each of Yahoo, Google, and eBay.18 The numbers tell a similar
story. One study found that, in 1998, Chinese and Indian engineers held
senior executive positions at “one-quarter of Silicon Valley’s new
technology businesses,” generating “$16.8 billion in sales and creating
58,282 jobs” that year alone.19
Another quantitative way of analyzing foreign STEM workers’ impact
on the U.S. economy is by looking at their contribution to intellectual
property development. One study estimated that 24.2% of all international
patent applications filed in 2006 with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
came from immigrants in the U.S. who are not citizens.20 Given this
backdrop, perhaps it is less surprising that the Obama administration
believes that skilled immigrants boosted U.S. GDP by 1.4%-2.4% in the

16. Registration Requirement for Petitioners Seeking to File H–1B Petitions on Behalf
of Aliens Subject to the Numerical Limitations, 76 Fed. Reg. 11686 (proposed Mar. 3,
2011) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 214 and 299).
17. Neil G. Ruiz et al., The Search for Skills: Demand for H1-B Workers in U.S.
Metropolitan Areas, METROPOLITAN POLICY PROGRAM AT BROOKINGS (July 18, 2012), at 2,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/7/18-h1b-visas-laborimmigration/18-h1b-visas-labor-immigration.pdf.
18. Jon Swartz, Tech Talents from India, Other Countries Leaving Silicon Valley, USA
TODAY, May 11, 2011, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2011-0510-tech-talents-leave-silicon-valley_n.htm; see also AnnaLee Saxenian, Silicon Valley’s
New Entrepreneurs, (Pub. Policy Inst. of Cal.), June 1999, at 89, available at
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_699ASR.pdf (providing a table listing influential
immigrants and their positions at Silicon Valley tech companies).
19. Id. at viii. These numbers include aliens present in the United States on variety of
different visas, so they should not be taken as signifying the economic contribution of H1-B
workers alone. However, it is safe to assume that H1-B workers contribute to part of this
growth.
20. Wadhwa, et al., America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs, DUKE MASTER OF
ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT PROGRAM and UC BERKELEY SCHOOL OF INFORMATION 27 (Jan.
4, 2007),
http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~anno/Papers/Americas_new_immigrant_entrepreneurs_I
.pdf.
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1990s.21 This type of data also helps explain the push to expand the current
H1-B program to encourage more skilled immigrants to bring their skills to
the U.S.
Employers in the high tech industry have been vocal in support of
expanding access to temporary work visas. Bill Gates, for instance, has
voiced his support.22 Lobbying groups such as The Internet Association are
also pushing for a higher cap on H1-B visas.23 Raising the cap on
temporary work visas seems to have bipartisan support in Congress and
will likely be a part of any immigration reform package that becomes law.24
C. Disagreement with the Program
The H1-B program is not without its detractors, who argue that the
main goal of employers is to take jobs away from Americans in favor of
underpaid foreign workers.25 There is some data to support this position.
One study found that computer professionals present in the U.S. on new
H1-B visas were making 25% less than their counterparts with U.S.
citizenship.26 Another concluded that H1-B admissions are associated with
a five to six percent drop in wages for computer programmers and systems
analysts.27
Explaining this phenomenon, one academic faults the government’s
definition of “prevailing wage,” which imposes a floor on wages for guest

21. THE WHITE HOUSE, BUILDING A 21ST CENTURY IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 24 (May
201l), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/immigration_blueprint.pdf.
22. Anne Broach, Bill Gates to Congress: Let Us Hire More Foreigners, CNET NEWS
(Mar. 12, 2008), http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9892046-7.html.
23. Michael Beckerman, Changing face of America increases urgency for STEM
immigration reform, THE INTERNET ASSOCIATION (Nov. 27, 2012),
http://internetassociation.org/changing-face-of-america-increases-urgency-for-stemimmigration-reform/ (The internet association is a lobbying group representing high tech
companies. This type of op-ed is an example of their push for changes to the current
system).
24. Matt O’Brien, Summary of the Immigration Innovation Act of 2013, CONTRA
COSTA TIMES (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.mercurynews.com/top-stories/ci_22473314/hightech-immigrant-reform-bill-would-bring-more.
25. See e.g., Jennifer Epstein, President Obama Google+ Chat Gets Personal,
POLITICO (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/72185.html (in
particular, see video exchange embedded in body of text).
26. RON HIRA, ECON. POLICY INST., THE H-1B AND L-1 VISA PROGRAMS OUT OF
CONTROL, EPI BRIEFING PAPER #280 11 (Econ. Policy Inst.), Oct. 14, 2010.
27. Jennifer Dorning and Charlie Fanning, Gaming the System 2012: Guest Worker
Visa Programs and Professional and Technical Workers in the U.S., DEPARTMENT FOR
PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, 34 (2012), available at http://dpeaflcio.org/wpcontent/uploads/Gaming-the-System-2012-Revised.pdf.
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worker employees, claiming it is “riddled with loopholes.”28 There is no
“labor market test” to determine the prevailing wage; instead the
government relies on surveys selected or conducted by employers.29 This
means that a skilled nonimmigrant with significant experience that would
merit a high salary in the U.S. labor market could be offered a lower salary
based on the average pay for the position he is being offered. Given that
employer support is required for a nonimmigrant to receive a visa, the labor
market may not be working efficiently, either for domestic or foreign
workers. Furthermore, some contend that the visa program helps
employers select away from older American workers, who bring more costs
to businesses.30 Other scholars who support the program contest these
arguments.31
D. Attempts to Undermine the Program at the State Level
Regardless of the overall merits of the policy, the discontent many
individuals feel toward the program could provide a motive for state
governments to pass or maintain legislation that attempts to undermine the
program and protect the state’s domestic workforce. One avenue for
opponents of the program to adopt would be to restrict the issuance of
professional licenses to only citizens and legal permanent residents.
States require that individuals obtain professional licenses before
entering a variety of professions to assure others of their competence.32 A
surprising number of fields are subject to such regulations, extending
beyond what one would traditionally assume would be regulated.33 For
example, Louisiana requires that even florists pass an exam and pay a fee

28. Vivek Wadhwa, America’s Other Immigration Crisis, THE AMERICAN (July 2008)
http://www.american.com/archive/2008/july-august-magazine-contents/
america2019s-other-immigration-crisis.
29. Dorning and Fanning, supra note 27, at 35. Consider also that employers are not
required to make the wages they pay to H1-B employees public. The documentation an
employer provides to the agency to support its compliance with the prevailing wage
requirement is considered confidential. Santiglia v. Sun Microsystems, US Dept. of Labor
Administrative Review Board, Case No. 2003-LCA-2 (2005).
30. Patrick Thibodeau, Norman Matloff Tells What’s Wrong with the H-1B Visa
Program, COMPUTERWORLD (Sept. 8, 2008),
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/323943/Norman_Matloff?taxonomyId=13&pageN
umber=1.
31. LEGOMSKY, supra note 4, at 364-65.
32. See Dick M. Carpenter et al., License to Work: A National of Burdens from
Occupational Licensing, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE (May 2012), available at
https://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/economic_liberty/occupational_licensing/licensetowor
k.pdf (comparing the professional licensure requirements of the fifty states and highlighting
requirements in unexpected industries).
33. Id.
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in order to obtain a license.34 Software engineers may soon face state
licensure requirements as well.35 Limiting these types of licenses to
citizens or permanent residents could affect how labor markets function in
states that are concerned about an influx of foreign workers.
If a patchwork of state licensure bans are permissible, companies
would have to think about locating personnel in states that do not interfere
with their efforts to hire nonimmigrants. Companies usually prefer uniform
regulation as it lowers costs and complexity.36 The constitutionality of such
state level legislation as applied to skilled guest workers thus looms large
for businesses and workers alike as Congress contemplates allowing even
more guest workers to enter the United States.
E.

A Refresher on Constitutional ‘levels of scrutiny’

When a court considers whether or not a challenged law violates the
Equal Protection Clause, it must first decide how much deference it should
give to the legislative branch that adopted the law. This is often discussed
as the “level of scrutiny” the court is applying. Courts often adopt a highly
deferential approach called rational basis review that asks only whether
there is a legitimate government interest underlying the law before
upholding it or striking it down.37 Other times courts will adopt strict
scrutiny, a highly skeptical approach that asks whether the law is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.38 Intermediate standards that
fall somewhere in between these two approaches are available as well.39
Once the court decides how closely to scrutinize a law, it then proceeds to
do so and decides whether or not to uphold it.

34. Id. at 30.
35. Kathy Kowalenko, Licensing Software Engineers Is in the Works, THE INSTITUTE
(Feb. 3, 2012), available at http://theinstitute.ieee.org/career-and-education/careerguidance/licensing-software-engineers-is-in-the-works.
36. See, e.g., Tim Fernholz, The patchwork of regulations entangling Square, and
every American internet startup that takes money, QUARTZ (Mar. 14, 2013),
http://qz.com/62265/why-square-and-seven-other-finance-start-ups-got-run-out-of-illinois/
(discussing the challenges some start up payment companies are facing when dealing with
varying types of state level banking regulations in the United States, as opposed to the
uniform system Europe has in place).
37. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (providing an
example of rational basis review in action).
38. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (discussing how
legal restrictions that curtail the rights of a single racial group are subject to “the most rigid
scrutiny”). Korematsu is an outlier, in that the law at issue was upheld despite the
application of strict scrutiny.
39. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to a law that discriminates based on gender).
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LEGAL ISSUES

A. Do State Licensure Bans Violate the Equal Protection Clause?
State licensure bans that discriminate against all nonimmigrants
violate the Equal Protection Clause when they are applied to skilled guest
workers who have permission to reside in the United States. The
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution states that “[n]o state shall . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.”40 As the Supreme Court has noted, the clause uses the word
“person” instead of “citizen,” which means it protects aliens as well.41
This section points out that because aliens lack a vote, and thus a
voice in the political process, courts must step in to protect their interests
when states adopt laws that discriminate against them. Skilled workers
admitted to the United States with permission to reside contribute
substantially to our economy. They have followed our immigration laws.
Some have lived here for years and plan on staying legally in the United
States even after the expiration of their current visas. The Fifth Circuit
decision not to protect these individuals against a discriminatory state law
was incorrect, and while the Second Circuit’s contrary decision may have
slightly overstated its case, it arrived at the correct conclusion.
1. Background Supreme Court Decisions
A long line of Supreme Court cases hold that strict scrutiny is applied
to state laws that broadly discriminate against all aliens, including aliens
who are legal permanent residents.42 This approach can be traced back at
least as far as Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, which held that it
was unconstitutional for California to refuse to grant commercial fishing
licenses to aliens who were ineligible for citizenship.43 The Court’s
approach to equal protection cases involving aliens was cemented in the
seminal case Graham v. Richardson, which held that “[a]liens . . . are a
prime example of a ‘discrete and insular minority’.”44 Applying strict
40. U.S. CONST. art. XIV, cl. 1.
41. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 35-36 (1915).
42. LEGOMSKY, supra note 4, at 1352.
43. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948).
44. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (finding that a class of
individuals constitutes a discreet and insular minority that lack political power is a trigger
for courts to scrutinize state laws that affect them as a class more closely, in accord with the
precedent set in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)). Without
political influence, minority groups are subject to the arbitrary prejudices of the rest of the
population, and must rely on the judicial system for protection. A key question is whether
the skilled guest workers in these cases should qualify as a discreet and insular minority, or

640

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 16:2

scrutiny review, Graham held that it was impermissible for states to
condition welfare benefits on U.S. citizenship, or to require that aliens live
in the United States for a certain number of years in order to qualify for
benefits.45
The Court continued to apply heightened scrutiny in subsequent cases
where states prohibited all noncitizens from obtaining professional licenses.
In Application of Griffiths, the Court struck down a Connecticut bar rule
that prohibited all noncitizens from sitting for the state’s bar exam.46 It also
followed this approach in Examining Board of Engineers, Architects &
Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, striking down a Puerto Rico law that
prohibited noncitizens from obtaining engineering licenses.47
Complicating matters, the status of Graham, Griffiths, and Flores was
cast into doubt by a series of cases that followed. These subsequent cases
found their roots in Sugarman v. Dougall, a contemporary of Graham,
where the Court noted that states have a legitimate interest in “limiting
participation in [its] government to those who are within the basic
conception of a political community.”48 The thrust of this line of cases was
that state laws that discriminated against aliens were to be analyzed under a
preemption approach rather than an equal protection approach. Analyzing
the disputes on preemption grounds arguably placed these disputes on more
favorable terrain for the states.
After Sugarman, the Court subsequently held that it is constitutional
for states to prevent aliens from participating in certain professions that
“implicate[] the ‘political function’” of the state.49 Foley also contained
language that tried to cabin Graham, and Griffiths as preemption cases
rather than equal protection cases.50 It did not overrule Graham, however,
should be treated differently.
45. Graham, 403 U.S. at 372.
46. Application of Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
47. Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero 426 U.S. 572,
605 (1976).
48. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973). Sugarman struck down a New
York law that prohibited aliens from serving in the state’s civil service system. Id.
49. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 298 (1978); LEGOMSKY, supra note 4, at 1353. In
Foley, the Court held that it was permissible for states to prohibit noncitizens from serving
in New York’s state police force. Foley, 435 U.S. at 291.
50. Id. at 295. Specifically the Court said: “Following Graham, a series of decisions
has resulted requiring state action to meet close scrutiny to exclude aliens as a class . . . .
These exclusions struck at the noncitizens’ ability to exist in the community, a position
seemingly inconsistent with the congressional determination to admit the alien to permanent
residence.” Id. This attempt to cabin Graham as a preemption case is somewhat
strengthened by Mathews v. Diaz, which upheld a federal law that conferred benefits
differently based on alienage. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). However, this
Comment addresses state, not federal law, so Diaz is not particularly relevant. As the Court
noted in Diaz, “equal protection analysis . . . involves significantly different considerations”
when “it concerns the relationship between aliens and the States rather than between aliens
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leaving its status an open question. The Court later expanded its political
function exception to Graham to include professions that involve a state’s
“sovereign functions.”51 States were now able to prohibit noncitizens from
working as public school teachers and probation officers.52 The Supreme
Court’s diverging opinions in all of these cases reflect significant divisions
on the Court.53 However, the justices supporting Graham’s equal
protection approach appeared to prevail when, in an 8-1 decision in Bernal
v. Fainter, the Court struck down a Texas law that prevented aliens from
becoming notaries public.54 Justice Marshall’s decision construed the
political function exception to Graham narrowly. Id. Sugarman was the
exception to Graham’s adoption of strict scrutiny, not the other way
around. Id. This Comment proceeds from the premise that Foley’s attempt
to cabin Graham, Griffiths etc. as preemption cases failed.
Assuming that state laws that discriminate against all aliens will be
strictly scrutinized under the Equal Protection Clause, another question
remains: what level of scrutiny is applied to state laws that discriminate
against subsets of the alien class—as opposed to the class as a whole? The
closest the Court has come to addressing this question was in Nyquist v.
Mauclet.55 In that decision, the Court held that it was unconstitutional for
New York to require legal permanent residents to state that they intended to
apply for United States citizenship in order to qualify for state tuition
assistance.56 By imposing this requirement, the state was denying benefits
to a segment of legal permanent residents who were content with their
current status and did not want to apply for citizenship.57 The Court held
that the law still discriminated against the alien class even though it only
affected certain members of the class.58 Notably, the Court stated that it
was impermissible for states to adopt discriminatory statutes whose

and the Federal Government.” Id. at 84-85.
51. LEGOMSKY, supra note 4, at 1353.
52. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68
(1979).
53. See Michael Cornelius Kelly, A Wavering Course: United States Supreme Court
Treatment of State Laws Regarding Aliens in the Twentieth Century, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
701, 729-38 (2011) (discussing the dividing lines on the court that help explain these dual,
conflicting strings of opinions).
54. Id. at 737, (citing Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984)). This Comment proceeds
from the premise that Foley’s attempt to cabin Graham, Griffiths etc. as preemption cases
failed. In Bernal, Justice Marshall construed the political function exception to Graham
narrowly. Id. Sugarman was the exception to Graham’s adoption of strict scrutiny, not the
other way around. Id.
55. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 8-9.
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purpose was to detect an alien’s “degree of national affinity.”59 However,
the case again involved a statute that discriminated against legal permanent
residents, so extending it to protect nonimmigrants is not a certain
proposition.
Graham itself can be read in different ways, making it challenging to
definitively apply it to the question of how courts ought to approach state
laws that discriminate against subsets of the alien class, like
nonimmigrants. The decision used the broad term “aliens” to describe the
protected class, which seems to include nonimmigrants. However, the
Court was only addressing a controversy involving legal permanent
residents, and its ultimate holding pertained only to “resident aliens.”60
Furthermore, the decision included an observation that aliens are similar to
citizens in that “[a]liens like citizens pay taxes and may be called into the
armed forces [and] may live within a state for many years . . . and
contribute to the economic growth of the state.”61 This suggests that an
alien’s connection to the community is a relevant consideration for courts
considering equal protection challenges, and calls into question efforts to
extend Graham to cover all aliens regardless of their relationship to the
community.
The Supreme Court has also held that state laws targeting
undocumented immigrants receive less scrutiny under the equal protection
clause than those that broadly discriminate against aliens regardless of their
legal status. In Plyer v. Doe, the Supreme Court applied heighted rational
basis review to a Texas law that excluded undocumented immigrant
children from public schools.62 Where the Court would draw the line and
stop strictly scrutinizing discriminatory state laws as applied to skilled
guest workers with temporary visas remains an open question and has
created a division amongst the Circuit Courts of Appeal.
2. The Circuit Split
As noted above, the Fifth and Second Circuits have disagreed about
how to apply these cases to the question of whether courts ought to strictly

59. Id. at 10.
60. Graham specifically held: “Accordingly, we hold that a state statute that denies
welfare benefits to resident aliens and one that denies them to aliens who have not resided
in the United States for a specified number of years violate the Equal Protection Clause.”
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (emphasis added). As is noted below,
what the term “resident alien” is referring to is ambiguous. It could be denoting permanent
residents, or it could be denoting a distinction found in the US tax code. It could also
simply mean anyone who lives in the United States. Infra note 103.
61. Id.
62. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). The Court struck down the exclusion. Id.
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scrutinize state laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants.63 The Fifth
Circuit adopted minimal rational basis review, arguing that nonimmigrants
are transients, and declined to strike down a state rule that prohibited
nonimmigrants from sitting for the Louisiana bar exam. The Second
Circuit applied strict scrutiny and struck down a New York statute that
prohibited nonimmigrants from obtaining a license to practice pharmacy.
The courts disagreed about whether or not nonimmigrants were transients,
and thus had insufficient connections to the community to warrant judicial
protection. They also disagreed about whether this was relevant under the
case law outlined above.
a. The Fifth Circuit Applies Rational Basis Review
In LeClerc v. Webb, the Fifth Circuit analyzed a Louisiana Supreme
Court rule that prohibited nonimmigrants from sitting for the state’s bar
exam.64 In a 2-1 decision, the court held that strict scrutiny applies only to
state laws that discriminate against legal permanent residents (LPRs), and
not to laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants.65 Furthermore, the
court declined to apply an intermediate level of scrutiny or a heightened
rational basis review.66 Applying minimal rational basis review, the court
upheld the state’s rule.67 Judge Stewart dissented from the majority’s equal
protection analysis, and the Circuit’s decision to deny a rehearing en banc
drew further dissent.68
The majority opinion drew a line excluding nonimmigrants from
heightened court protection because the majority felt the transience of
nonimmigrants distinguished them from the legal permanent residents the
Supreme Court had before them in Graham and Griffiths.69 The opinion
noted that in Plyer, the Court had applied only heightened rational basis
review, which demonstrated that strict scrutiny is not appropriate for every
challenge to a discriminatory state law targeting subsets of the alien class.70
63. The Sixth Circuit has adopted the Fifth Circuit’s approach, upholding a Tennessee
law that required a person to be a citizen or a legal permanent resident in order to obtain a
driver’s license. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523 (6th Cir.
2007). In an effort to maintain a focus on employment law issues, this Comment focuses on
the other two Circuit opinions.
64. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005). The case arose when six foreign
lawyers were denied permission to sit for the state’s bar exam. Recent Cases, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 669, 676 n. 63 (2005). Two suits were filed. LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 405.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 426 (Stewart, J., dissenting); LeClerc, 444 F.3d at 428 (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting).
69. Id.
70. Id.
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The majority also noted that the Supreme Court has never invalidated
a state law discriminating against nonimmigrants under the Equal
Protection Clause, or applied strict scrutiny to such a law.71 It further
observed that the Supreme Court had the opportunity to do so in one case
but invalidated the law on preemption grounds without addressing the
equal protection issue.72 Looking at the body of Supreme Court opinions
on equal protection alienage claims, the opinion states that two concerns
underlie the Supreme Court’s decision to apply strict scrutiny in cases such
as Graham and Griffiths: “(1) the inability of resident aliens to exert
political power in their own interest given their status as virtual citizens;
and (2) the similarity of resident aliens and citizens.”73 The opinion noted
that in Griffiths, the Supreme Court had compared resident aliens’
contributions to society, including service in the armed forces, participation
in the economy, and their tax obligations to those of full citizens.74
The opinion also cited a law review article by David Martin, a
Professor of Law at the University of Virginia, which argues that courts
should apply different levels of scrutiny based on an alien’s connection to
the community in which they live.75 An idea of reciprocity is at play here,
namely that an immigrant who respectfully contributes to the community
should receive more protection from courts than one who contributes
little.76 Martin’s proposed hierarchy would place legal permanent residents
at the top and undocumented immigrants at the bottom, with
nonimmigrants somewhere in the middle.77 The article suggests these
umbrella groups are appropriate proxies for ascertaining an individual’s
connection to the community because legal statutes outline the ways in
which members can contribute to the community, what members are
entitled to, and how long they can stay.78 These statutory umbrella groups
also indicate whether or not an individual has abided by our country’s
71. Id. at 416.
72. Id., citing Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
73. Id. at 417.
74. Id. at 418, citing Application of Griffiths, 413 U.S., 717722 (1973).
75. Id. at 425 n.55.
76. David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens:
The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47 (2001). As Martin put it:
Aliens . . . may be members of a relevant community they share with citizens,
and are thus entitled to the respect of certain rights and subject to certain
reciprocal duties. But there are different levels of membership . . . and
additional reciprocal duties and rights, or at least more stringent protections of
rights, will come into being for persons as they move to higher circles of
membership.
Id. at 89.
77. Id. at 95-96.
78. Id.
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immigration laws.79
Adopting this approach, the Fifth Circuit considered ways in which
nonimmigrants differ from citizens in how they relate to the community.
Holding that nonimmigrants deserve less protection than legal permanent
residents and citizens, the court pointed out that nonimmigrants are not
allowed to serve in the military, and are subject to different tax treatment
than citizens.80 Rejecting strict scrutiny, the Fifth Circuit also refused to
apply an intermediate level of scrutiny or heightened rational basis
review.81 The court distinguished the Plyer case, where the Supreme Court
adopted heightened rational basis review when analyzing a law that
discriminated against the children of undocumented immigrants as sui
generis.82 The court noted that the decision involved the Supreme Court’s
deep sympathy for children who were not culpable for their plight and were
facing the prospect of an inadequate education.83 The court held that
professionals residing here on a work visa knew they were going to face
restrictions when they came to the United States, and are thus entitled to
less court protection than the children in Plyer.84 Ultimately, applying
standard rational basis review, the court upheld Louisiana’s bar rule.85 It
held that Louisiana had a legitimate state interest in regulating the legal
profession, and that having the ability to locate attorneys under its
jurisdiction helped ensure “continuity and accountability.”86 The court
noted the state’s concern that a “malfeasant or nonfeasant” nonimmigrant
attorney could flee the United States to avoid accountability.87 The court
further held that it could not rule that the law was irrationally overinclusive
since it was not the court’s place to substitute its opinion on a law’s
wisdom for the perception of its drafters under standard rational basis
review.88
b. The Second Circuit Applies Strict Scrutiny
The Second Circuit rejected the Fifth Circuit’s approach and applied
strict scrutiny.89 The court essentially provided four grounds for its

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. The article divides undocumented immigrants into three more categories. Id.
LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 418 (5th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 419-20.
Id. at 420.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 421.
Id.
Id. at 422.
Id.
Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 76 (2d Cir. 2012).
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decision.90 First, the court rejected the idea that an alien’s degree of
connection to the community was a relevant consideration for courts.91
Second, the court pointed out that all aliens, including nonimmigrants, lack
political clout, which is the basis for court protection.92 Third, the court
stated that the nonimmigrant litigants before it were so similar to citizens
that, even assuming for the sake of argument such a comparison was a
relevant consideration, strict scrutiny would still be appropriate.93 Finally,
the court seemed to believe that the legal status of the litigants before it
meant they needed greater protection from courts than those afforded
undocumented children in Plyer.94
Looking at the first--and critical-- issue of societal contributions, the
court construed the body of Supreme Court precedent differently than the
Fifth Circuit. According to the Second Circuit, Graham’s discussion of the
similarities between legal permanent residents and citizens was simply
included to provide a response to the state’s arguments that its statute
served a compelling state interest.95 The Second Circuit did not view it as
establishing a litmus test that courts could use to decide what level of
scrutiny to adopt.96 The court narrowly construed Foley and the subsequent
cases that created room for states to discriminate against aliens in an effort
to create a “political community,” that could have buttressed the argument
that an exception to strict scrutiny should be carved out for nonimmigrants
as well.97 According to the Second Circuit, the Foley exception to strict
scrutiny only pertained to discriminatory state employment laws that
involved “important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial
positions” involving public policy.98 Thus, the Second Circuit considered it
inapplicable to the case before it.99
The Second Circuit viewed the scrutiny determination as revolving
around political clout.100 Since nonimmigrants are arguably even less
90. Id. at 75.
91. Id. LeClerc actually quoted Griffiths in support of its conclusion that it should
assess the contributions a nonimmigrant makes to the community before determining what
level of scrutiny to apply to laws that discriminate against them. See LeClerc, 419 F.3d at
418. This does not really change the argument, but it could be confusing to readers
comparing both opinions.
92. Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 75.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 78.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 73-74.
98. Id. This is not an entirely fair reading of the case law, as the exception outlined in
Foley did expand somewhat in subsequent cases to include the execution of sovereign
functions. See supra notes 51 and 52 and accompanying text (discussing this expansion).
99. Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 73-74.
100. Id. at 77.
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politically influential than legal permanent residents who have roots here,
the Second Circuit held that they should be afforded heightened court
protection.101
Even if the differences between nonimmigrants and citizens’ societal
contributions were an important factor, the Second Circuit would have
reached the same conclusion.102 The court noted that nonimmigrants pay
taxes on income earned in the United States, and that the doctrine of dual
intent means that many nonimmigrant aliens who are supposedly here on a
temporary basis will actually stay here for many years afterwards.103
The court did not leave it at that, however. It made a determination
that Plyer compelled it to apply at least heightened basis review to claims
brought by lawfully admitted nonimmigrants.104 Recall that in Plyer, the
Supreme Court had applied heightened rational basis review to claims
brought by the children of undocumented immigrants regarding their
education.105 The Second Circuit stated that applying heightened rational
basis review to some undocumented aliens while applying only standard
rational basis review to lawfully admitted nonimmigrants would create an
“odd, some might say absurd result[].”106 It called such an outcome
“illogical,” and stated that it would “clearly contradict the federal
government’s determination as to which individuals have a legal right to be
here.”107
The Second Circuit decided to apply strict scrutiny to the New York
statute.108 It held that New York’s licensure ban did not serve a compelling
state interest and was not narrowly tailored, and thus violated the Equal
Protection Clause.109 The court observed that there was no evidence that
transient pharmacists were endangering the public health, and that even if
this were a problem, malpractice insurance would be a more appropriate
solution.110
101. Id. at 77.
102. Id.
103. Id. Whether or not an individual is considered a “resident alien” is an important
tax consideration, but nonimmigrants can be considered “resident aliens” for the purposes of
taxation. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 427 n.1 (5th Cir. 2005) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Nonimmigrant aliens are treated the same as legal permanent residents for taxation purposes
if they are in the United States “at least 31 calendar days during the course of the year” and
183 days over the course of the previous three years. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. §
7701(b)(3)(2010)). This adds further ambiguity to Graham’s holding, since the court stated
that strict scrutiny applied in order to protect “resident aliens.”
104. Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at at 78.
105. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
106. Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 78.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 79.
110. Id.
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c. Analysis
Strict scrutiny should often be applied to state laws that discriminate
against the umbrella of aliens who are classified as nonimmigrants when
they come up in as applied challenges. The Fifth Circuit’s argument that
an alien’s connection to the community should be a consideration for
determining which level of scrutiny to apply has some intuitive appeal.
However, it has little basis in precedent, and its use of the nonimmigrant
umbrella as a proxy for transience shows how it will often fail in practice.
While many nonimmigrants may only be present in the United States
briefly, those who choose to stay contribute significantly to our
communities and deserve judicial protection.
It is true that the Supreme Court has never squarely addressed what
level of scrutiny to apply when considering state laws targeting
nonimmigrants instead of legal permanent residents. However, in Graham
and Nyquist, laws that discriminated against a subset of the alien class were
held to be unconstitutional because they discriminated against the class as a
whole.111 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit’s reliance on Foley seems
questionable, given the Court’s decision reaffirming a broad reading of
Graham in Bernal.
Regardless, Foley does not provide the support the Fifth Circuit needs
to establish that nonimmigrants should be handled differently than
permanent residents. Foley suggested that strict scrutiny was applied in
Graham because states were adopting laws that conflicted with the federal
government’s grant of an offer to reside in the United States.112 Yet the
state laws discriminating against nonimmigrants do the same thing. The
umbrella of nonimmigrants includes skilled workers who have been offered
the chance to work and live in the United States for years. Foley would
only provide support for a state law that discriminated against a class of
immigrants who received no offer of residence from the federal
government. The Supreme Court case law does not clearly and
unambiguously support the “contributions to society” inquiry the Fifth
Circuit decided to undertake, and until it does, it would be precarious to
assume that it is appropriate. Setting aside the issue of precedent, it is not
clear that courts should be deciding whether one group of aliens living in
the United States is somehow more American than another group, a
troubling conclusion for many readers looking at a court’s decision in this
area.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the level of review

111. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1
(1977).
112. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295 (1978).
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should depend on an alien’s contributions to society, strict scrutiny is
appropriate because skilled workers within the nonimmigrant umbrella are
contributing substantially to this country’s economic development and
innovative spirit. The introduction to this comment highlighted the impact,
represented as an estimated percentage, that skilled immigrants have on
gross domestic product, and discussed skilled immigrants’ significant
contributions to the development of new technologies. The Second Circuit
did a good job of highlighting some of the formal legal designations that
apply to this group of aliens. Under federal tax law, an alien’s
contributions to the public depends not on whether or not they are a
nonimmigrant, but on how many days they have spent in the United States
over the previous three years.113
Thus many nonimmigrants are
contributing to the United States treasury, even though they do not have the
chance to vote.
In addition, the doctrine of dual intent creates the possibility that many
skilled immigrants will legally stay in the United States after the expiration
of their visa.114 There are some statistics, however, that lend credence to
the Fifth Circuit’s concerns about transience. AnnaLee Saxenian’s article
Silicon Valley’s New Entrepreneurs, noted in the introduction, provides
valuable insight into the nonimmigrant experience.115 She argues that her
data show that it is incorrect to assume that nonimmigrants will stay
permanently in the United States.116
She found that an average of 47% of the 1990-1991 foreign doctoral
recipients in science and engineering were still working in the United
States in 1995.117 This varied significantly based on the student’s country
of origin. For instance, 88% of Chinese and 79% of Indian doctoral
recipients stayed in the United States until 1995, while only 13% and 11%
of Japanese and South Korean doctoral recipients, respectively, remained
that long.118
Nevertheless, Saxenian noted that skilled immigrants who do stay
“play a critical role as middlemen linking businesses in the United States to
those in geographically distant regions.”119 The fact that some skilled
immigrants stay while others leave simply highlights how precarious it is to
113. See supra text accompanying note 103 (discussing tax treatment of
nonimmigrants).
114. Recall from the introduction that the doctrine of dual intent means that H1-B visa
holders can pursue permanent resident status despite having accepted a limited duration visa
to initially enter the United States.
115. AnnaLee Saxenian, Silicon Valley’s New Entrepreneurs, (Pub. Policy Inst. of Cal.),
June 1999, at 3 n.3, available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_699ASR.pdf.
116. Id. at 2-3.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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use the nonimmigrant tag as a proxy for transience or community
contribution. While the idea may have theoretical appeal, the data show
how inadequate the labels, “permanent resident” and “nonimmigrant,” are
for achieving that task. This also underscores an important point—these
licensure bans may be an unconstitutional violation of equal protection as
applied to certain subgroups of the nonimmigrant class who can
demonstrate their contributions to American society, even as they remain
valid as applied to say, a tourist, who also falls under the large
“nonimmigrant” umbrella. This comment is focused on skilled guest
workers however, not the status of other more transient nonimmigrants.
That being said, the rationale the Second Circuit adopted with regards
to the Plyer decision is troubling. The equitable arguments presented to the
court in Plyer, those of children who have since been termed
“Dreamers,”120 are substantially stronger than those that could be offered
by a frustrated computer engineer, or recent law school graduate who
cannot sit for the bar exam. The Plyer decision in some respects should
actually counsel against adopting strict scrutiny in this case, as Dreamers
have lived in the United States for years, contribute substantially to society,
and yet cannot vote because of a decision their parents made for them. In a
vacuum, they would appear to fit more easily into the “discreet and insular”
minority description provided by Carolene Products than skilled guest
workers. However, the fact that the Supreme Court was willing to
substantially penalize Dreamer petitioners in Plyer for their immigration
status does not mean that courts ought to penalize nonimmigrants even
more severely just to be consistent on equitable grounds. The Supreme
Court is evidently greatly concerned with undocumented vs. documented
status. Perhaps the best solution would simply be for courts to focus on
precedent that is most on point – cases in which the Court addressed claims
brought by documented immigrants.
Courts should not follow the Fifth Circuit’s invitation to create
different levels of review that hinge on whether or not an alien falls under
the nonimmigrant umbrella. Supreme Court precedent does not support the
approach, and it fails to achieve its goals because the term “nonimmigrant”
includes individuals with substantially different ties to the community.
Courts should instead protect skilled nonimmigrant guest workers from
laws that discriminate against them based on their status by applying strict
scrutiny to the regulations underlying their as applied claims.

120. Who and Where the DREAMers Are, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL,
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/who-and-where-dreamers-are (last visited Feb.
17, 2014).
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B. Are State Licensure Bans Preempted by Federal Law?
Setting aside the equal protection issue, state licensure bans are also
preempted by the Immigration and Nationality Act and its accompanying
regulations. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution requires that state
laws give way when Congress intends for its legislation to supersede state
laws in the same field.121 Congress can make its intent clear through an
express provision in a statute. In the absence of such a provision, courts
may infer Congressional intent where the federal government has passed a
comprehensive piece of legislation in the regulatory field at issue, or where
a state law presents a conflict with federal law that members of Congress
could not have anticipated.122
After reviewing the background cases that make up the Supreme
Court’s relevant preemption jurisprudence, this comment explores the
arguments of the Fifth and Second Circuit. It then argues that the Second
Circuit’s position was correct. While there is no express preemption
provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act, one can infer
Congressional intent to occupy the field from the statute. Moreover, state
licensure bans create an obstacle to Congressional goals.
1. Background Cases
The concept of preemption seems straightforward at first glance.123
Federalism recognizes that both the states and the federal government
“have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect.”124 However,
a dilemma emerges when state and federal law are at odds with one
another. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides a solution to
this problem, stating that the “Constitution, and Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of
the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.”125 Thus state laws that conflict or displace
federal laws are invalid.126 When a court analyzes whether or not a federal
121. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
122. See Preemption, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE (Aug. 19, 2012, 5:22 PM),
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/preemption (explaining, defining, and giving examples of
preemption in federal law).
123. See Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for law students: Preemption and the Arizona
Immigration Law, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 9, 2011, 1:37 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/12/scotus-for-law-students-preemption-and-the-arizonaimmigration-law/ (explaining preemption in context of the Arizona immigration law and
showing how preemption might seem simple but can become complex in application).
124. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012).
125. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
126. The concept of preemption dates back to the early years of the republic. See e.g.,
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law preempts a state law, it is investigating Congressional intent in crafting
the federal law.
Preemption breaks into two categories: express, and implied. Where
a federal statute includes an express preemption clause, state statutes that
fall within the clause are preempted, because Congressional intent is
clear.127 In situations where no express preemption clause is included in the
federal statute or where it is inapplicable, courts may still find that the
federal law implies that the state law is preempted.128 This occurs when
Congress has passed such a comprehensive statute that one may infer that
Congress intended to occupy the field on its own without state level
supplementation, or where the state law conflicts with the federal law.129
If the alleged conflict occurs in a field that states have traditionally
occupied, courts start with the presumption that the state law is not
preempted and look to see if the “clear and manifest purpose of Congress”
is to the contrary.130 Two Supreme Court decisions, De Canas v. Bica, and
Toll v. Moreno, contain similarities with the issues presented by state
nonimmigrant licensure bans.
In De Canas, the Court upheld a California statute that prohibited an
employer from “knowingly employ[ing] an alien who is not entitled to
lawful residence in the United States if such employment would have an
adverse effect on lawful resident workers.”131 The Court’s decision
addressed whether or not Congress had occupied the field of immigration
law, such that state laws governing the employment of illegal aliens were
impermissible. The Court held that the California statute fell within the
state’s traditional police power to regulate the “employment relationship”
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (applying
the Supremacy Clause to disputes of federal versus state law). Concern about crafting a
cohesive foreign policy was one of the original justifications for the supremacy clause.
Foreign countries need to be able to deal with one entity—the federal government—in order
to be sure of the “status, safety, and security” of their citizens. See Arizona v. United States
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 39 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
2003)). John Jay was concerned that if the states were left to their own devices, border
states would act impulsively based on local concerns and create problems with foreign
nations. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 39 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). He discussed
how some states had mistreated Native Americans within their borders. Id. There seems to
be a great deal of parallel with Jay’s concerns and immigration issues, which presumably is
why the Supreme Court referenced his essay in their recent decision. There seem to be
parallels to the issue here as well.
127. See English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990) (explaining preemption in
context with Congress’ enactment of laws to limit the nuclear industry’s liability).
128. See id. at 79 (explaining how courts can infer preemption from Congressional
Acts).
129. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947) (providing
multiple cases that show how Congress can issue laws intended to preempt state laws).
130. Id.
131. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 352 (1976).

2014]

PROFESSIONAL LICENSES

653

and “protect workers within the [s]tate,” and searched for evidence of
Congressional intent to displace state law.132
The Court noted a particular provision of federal law prohibiting farm
labor contractors from hiring undocumented workers.133 The provision
included language stating that it was merely intended to “supplement” state
laws and regulations, and that the state rules were still in effect.134 The
Court construed this provision as persuasive evidence that Congress had
not “unmistakably . . . ordained” a total occupation of the field, and
rejected the challenge to the California law.135
The Court did not consider whether the California law was preempted
because it stood as an obstacle to federal law.136 Instead, the Court noted
the importance of discerning the proper construction of the California law
before reaching a conclusion.137 It suggested that the outcome might
change if the law applied to immigrants that were lawfully permitted to
work here, but were not entitled to lawful residence.138
De Canas is an old case. In 2012, the Supreme Court addressed it in
Arizona v. United States,139 noting that De Canas’ holding was limited to
its own time period because federal immigration law has changed since the
1970s.140 Still, the Court’s overall approach in De Canas remains useful,
and dicta at the end of the decision is instructive for its discussion on
obstacle preemption and the importance of statutory construction.
Toll v. Moreno is another important background case. In Toll, the
Court held that the University of Maryland could not discriminate against
nonimmigrants by preventing them from receiving in-state tuition.141 The
Court noted that, “state regulation not congressionally sanctioned that
discriminates against aliens lawfully admitted to the country is
impermissible if it imposes additional burdens not contemplated by

132. Id. at 356-57.
133. See id. at 361-62 (citing a provision of the Farm Labor Contractor Regulation Act).
134. See id. (exploring the relationship between the Farm Labor Contractor Regulation
Act and state law).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 363-64.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2503 (2012).
140. Id. See also, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1974 (2011)
(discussing De Canas in light of changes to federal law).
141. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1982), (citing Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm’n 334 U.S. 410 (1941) and Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 378 (1971)). By
citing Graham as supporting its Supremacy Clause analysis, Toll arguably adds support to
those that argue that Graham has been limited such that its equal protection holdings are no
longer good law. However, since Bernal came down two years after Toll, this argument is
not very convincing. See supra note 54 (discussing attempts to cabin Bernal).
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Congress.”142 The Court hedged however, adding: “to be sure, when
Congress has done nothing more than permit a class of aliens to enter the
country temporarily, the proper application of the principle is likely to be a
matter of some dispute.”143
The Court ruled that Maryland’s tuition policy was preempted for two
reasons. First, the Court noted that Congress had allowed G-4 visa holders
(a type of nonimmigrant) to establish domicile in the U.S., and that a state
policy denying them the right to establish in-state status amounted to an
impermissible burden not contemplated by Congress.144 Second, the Court
reasoned that since Congress had expressly provided G-4 visa holders with
significant tax exemptions, Maryland’s policy of financially discriminating
against them was an obstacle to federal policy.145 The Court pointed out
that the tax exemptions were designed to induce foreign organizations to
locate in the United States, and that barring employees from receiving
preferential tuition rates inhibited this effort.146 The Court stated: “we
cannot conclude that Congress ever contemplated that a State, in the
operation of a university, might impose discriminatory tuition charges and
fees solely on account of the federal immigration classification.”147
2. The Circuit Split
The Fifth and Second Circuits disagreed over whether the Immigration
and Nationality Act preempts state licensure bans. The Fifth Circuit
viewed the licensure ban before it as operating harmoniously with a federal
law that only peripherally touched on professional licensure.148 The Second
Circuit held that such bans impermissibly conflict with Congressional
objectives.149 The Second Circuit is correct. Congress occupied the field
of immigrant employment through its regulations of nonimmigrant
employment and expressed a policy preference to bring individuals here to
work professionally. State laws preventing these individuals from working
conflict with that goal and are preempted by the federal legislation.

142. Toll, 458 U.S. at 12-13.
143. Id. at 13. G4 visa holders are considered nonimmigrants under federal statute, just
as H1-B visa holders are. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(15)(G)(iv) (2012). The category includes
officers and employees of certain international organizations, such as the World Bank, and
their immediate families. Id.
144. Toll, 458 U.S. at 14-17.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 17.
148. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 423-26 (2005).
149. Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 80 (2d Cir. 2012).
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a. The Fifth Circuit holds state licensure bans are not preempted
In LeClerc v. Webb, the Fifth Circuit unanimously held that a
Louisiana rule that prohibited nonimmigrant aliens from sitting for the bar
exam was not preempted by federal law.150 The court held that the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) left it up to the states to decide who
qualifies for professional licensure in a state, and that there is nothing
prohibiting a state from deciding that nonimmigrant aliens simply do not
qualify.151 8 U.S.C. § 1184 (i)(2)(A) provides that one of the methods for
qualifying as a practitioner of a “specialty occupation” is to obtain “full
state licensure to practice in the occupation, if such licensure is required to
practice in the occupation.”152
The decision’s discussion of preemption began by citing De Canas for
the proposition that alien employment is a field that “tolerates harmonious
state regulation.”153 The court then attempted to distinguish Toll by noting
the differences between the G-4 visas held by the plaintiffs there, and the
H1-B and F-1 visas held by the plaintiffs before the court.154 The court
noted that G-4 visa holders are not transients, but that some nonimmigrants
are.155
The court then tried to show how the Louisiana rule was harmonious
with the INA.156 It pointed out that student visa holders are restricted in
their ability to obtain gainful employment, and that aliens could obtain H1B visas in other ways aside from obtaining professional licensure.157 It
observed that aliens can meet the specialty occupation criteria by attaining
a bachelors or higher degree that meets the “minimum for entry into the
occupation in the United States,”158 and that visas may also be granted in
certain circumstances where states allow persons to work under the
150. LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 423-26. While Judge Stewart dissented in the case, he
concurred with the majority decision on the preemption issue. Id. at 426 (chronicling Judge
Stewart’s dissent).
151. Id.
152. 8 U.S.C. § 1184 (i)(2)(A) (2012).
153. LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 424.
154. Id. at 424 (explaining how F-1 visas are temporary visas held by students studying
in the United States).
155. The court also oddly suggested that Maryland’s tuition policy in Toll “proscrib[ed]
by state law what Congress expressly permit[ted] by federal statute.” Id. (tense changed).
The court did not point out the section of federal law in Toll that expressly discussed state
tuition policies, so it is not clear what support there is for this interpretation of the decision.
The Maryland statute did not prevent matriculation; it just meant that the students had to pay
more to go there.
156. Id.
157. Id. As discussed in the introduction, obtaining a professional license is one way of
fulfilling a prerequisite for obtaining an H1-B visa. There are other ways of meeting the
eligibility requirements.
158. 8 U.S.C. § 1184 (i)(1)(B) (2012).
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supervision of licensed practitioners in lieu of having a license
themselves.159 In light of these alternative routes to a visa, the court held
that the state licensure ban was “in accord, rather than conflict with federal
regulation of alien employment.”160
The court also held that the Louisiana rule was not an obstacle to
Congressional objectives.161 It pointed out that in De Canas the Court had
upheld a California law addressing the employment of undocumented
immigrants in spite of “overlap” between federal immigration regulations
and the state employment regulation system.162 The court held that the case
before it similarly presented a situation where a federal law had only
“peripheral[ly]” touched on an area of state regulation.163 The court
concluded by arguing that the Louisiana law was designed to deal with
local problems, and that this was permissible so long as it was consistent
with federal law.164
b. The Second Circuit holds state licensure bans preempted
In Dandamudi v. Tisch the Second Circuit reached a different
conclusion when considering a New York law that barred nonimmigrant
aliens from receiving pharmacy licenses.165 The court stated that the state
law was preempted because it stood “as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”166 The
court stated that “Congress exercised its immigration power to permit”
nonimmigrant aliens “to participate in certain [specialty] occupations so
long as they are professionally qualified to engage in the particular
159. LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 425 n.55.
160. Id. at 425.
161. Id. at 425.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 80 (2d Cir. 2012). The Second Circuit’s
discussion of preemption is dicta because the court held that not all the plaintiffs had
standing to bring a preemption challenge to the state law. Id. Several of the plaintiffs held
TN visas, which are granted to people interested in coming to the United States pursuant to
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Id. According to the court, “the
NAFTA Implementation Act allows only the United States to bring actions against state
laws inconsistent with NAFTA. See 19 U.S.C. § 3312(b)(2).” Dandamudi, 686 F.3d 66, 81
(2d Cir. 2012). Still, the strong language of the court shows how it would have decided the
case had the TN visa holders not participated. In light of this, courts should address the
equal protection issue first to give a definitive answer to whether the law is unconstitutional
as applied to all skilled guest workers, as opposed to just some of them. But see, Justin
Hess, Nonimmigrants, Equal Protection, and the Supremacy Clause, 2010 BYU L. REV.
2277 (2010) (arguing that preemption should be a court’s first area of concern in light of the
approach adopted in Toll v. Moreno).
166. Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 80.

2014]

PROFESSIONAL LICENSES

657

specialty occupation they seek to practice.”167
The court argued that granting states the right to prohibit
nonimmigrant aliens from receiving licenses without considering their skill
set would mean allowing a state’s traditional police power in the field of
employment law to “morph” into something far different.168 Rather than
simply keeping tabs on the “educational and experiential qualifications” of
workers, the state would be rendering federal immigration laws
“advisory.”169 The court argued that federal immigration law states that a
certain class of nonimmigrant aliens should be admitted to the country to
obtain specialty occupations, subject to a state’s determination that an
individual has the qualifications to be considered part of that class.170 It felt
that the New York law flipped the law on its head by giving the states the
right to determine which classes of employees could come to work there,
and thus stood as an obstacle to the federal law.171
The court further rejected the argument that the hedging language in
Toll amounted to a rule and added that in any event Congress had done
more than merely allow nonimmigrants to enter temporarily: it also gave
them the right to work in certain occupations.172 It then cited to twelve
pages of the Court’s recent Arizona decision with much explanation and
concluded that the state statute presented serious preemption problems
because of the obstacles posed to the accomplishment of the purposes of
the INA.173
c. Analysis
There is no express preemption provision in the statute, so the analysis
focuses on implied preemption. While Congressional intent is not crystal
clear, the extensive nature of its regulations of nonimmigrant employment
suggests that it intended to occupy the field except in express situations. In
any event, state laws that prevent skilled immigrants from obtaining
professional licensure stand as an obstacle to Congressional objectives and
are invalid.
i. Field Preemption
LeClerc’s heavy reliance on the De Canas case to support the notion
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 80-81.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that Congress has not preempted the field of state regulations of
employment law with respect to aliens is problematic. Arizona narrowed
the applicability of De Canas, explaining: “When there was no
comprehensive federal program regulating the employment of unauthorized
aliens, this Court found that a State had authority to pass its own laws on
the subject.”174
The Court noted that federal laws had changed
substantially, and that at the time of the De Canas decision, the federal
government had expressed no more than a “peripheral concern with [the]
employment of illegal entrants.”175 However, the Court observed that
federal immigration law had changed, and highlighted the ways Congress
had begun regulating the employment of undocumented immigrants.
LeClerc asserts that licensure law is a peripheral concern of the federal
law because it “does not itself mandate domestic professional licensing” for
nonimmigrant aliens.176 However, following the Court’s approach in
Arizona reveals that this is overly simplistic. Congress has expressed more
than a peripheral concern with the employment of nonimmigrant aliens. In
fact, it has adopted an extensive set of regulations about the conditions that
must be present before an employer can successfully petition for a visa for
a potential entrant and grant them employment.177 Congress has also
mandated that workers present on a temporary work visa be paid a
prevalent wage, and that they cannot enter to work at a company in the
midst of a labor disruption.178 The presence of these regulations undercut
the LeClerc decision’s arguments on field preemption just as new federal
rules supplanted De Canas’ holding on Congress’ occupation of the field of
undocumented immigrant employment regulation. Many academics agree
that federal law preempts state licensure bans.179

174. Arizona v. United States 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2503 (2012).
175. Id. at 2503-04.
176. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 425 (5th Cir. 2005).
177. See, e.g., Fragomen, supra note 8, at 6:9 (discussing government regulation of
minimum salaries employers must pay H1-B guest workers).
178. A review of the legislative history of the Immigration Act of 1990 was not
particularly illuminating as to congressional intent regarding the licensure issue. See, e.g.,
IGOR I. KAVASS, BERNARD D. REAMS, JR., THE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1990, A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF PUB. L. NO. 101-649 269 (1997).
179. See, e.g., Erin Delaney, Note: In the Shadow of Article I: Applying A Dormant
Commerce Clause Analysis to State Laws Regulating Aliens, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1821 (2007)
(discussing the issues of state laws that regulated immigrants and using the Dormant
Commerce Clause’s as a potential solution); Hess, supra note 165 (detailing the interplay of
the Supremacy Clause and the Equal Protection Clause in relation to the constitutionality of
immigrations laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants); Justine Storch, Legal
Impediments facing nonimmigrant’s entering licensed professions, 7 MOD. AM. 12 (2011)
(discussing the licensing issues facing nonimmigrants and the impact of federal immigration
laws on this process).
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ii. Obstacle Preemption
The preemption argument that the state law stands as an obstacle to
the full purposes and objectives of Congress is strong. In Arizona, the
Court relied on the text, structure and history of the federal statute in
determining Congressional intent.180 A logical reading of 8 U.S.C. § 1184
suggests that the Second Circuit’s construction of the licensure provision as
allowing a state to impose professional qualification requirements, but not
barring completely a class of aliens from achieving licensure is correct. As
the district judge noted in Adusumelli v. Steiner, the lower court opinion
preceding Dandamudi, any other reading would render a portion of the
United States Code merely advisory – if the fifty states so chose, they could
nullify part of the H1-B program.181
This is supported by dicta in De Canas, where the court was cautious
about properly construing California’s law so as to ascertain whether or not
it discriminated against workers who were lawfully present in the country,
but not entitled to permanent residence.182 Apparently the Court felt that
even under the old, less comprehensive federal law this would have made
for a compelling obstacle argument.
While formalistically it is true that potential entrants could still get a
visa in spite of state licensure restrictions by fulfilling one of the other
possible requirements, such as having significant experience in the field, or
by having requisite degrees for entry into the field, it is unclear how a
potential entrant would be able to meet the other requirements in order to
actually get a visa. It seems unlikely that an employer would sponsor an
employee to come to the United States, given the significant expenditures
and potential liabilities involved in the application process if it knew that
the entrant would not be able to obtain a license to practice in the field the
company brought them over to work in.
The Fifth Circuit’s answer seems to be that these workers could
simply work the duration of their visa as apprentices, which is allowable
under federal regulations, and would not run afoul of licensure
requirements.183 Yet it remains unclear how forcing foreigners into
unnecessary apprenticeships is not an obstacle to a federal program that is
designed to enhance the productivity of the United States workforce by
encouraging foreign talent to join us.
Furthermore, the similarities with the Toll decision are instructive.
180. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505.
181. Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 80 (2d Cir. 2012).
182. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 363-64 (1976).
183. See LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 425 n.56 (5th Cir. 2005) (discussing how
federal regulations permit H1-B visa holders to work as a subordinate to someone that holds
a professional license in certain circumstances).
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While it is true that the visas held by the plaintiffs in that case differ from
H1-B and other temporary work visas it is not clear why these differences
should affect the analysis. In Toll, the Court ruled that it was
impermissible for Maryland to interfere with a federal tax program
designed to encourage a group of aliens to come to the United States.184
The Court stated that: “In light of Congress’ explicit decision not to bar G4 aliens from acquiring domicile, the State’s decision to deny ‘in-state’
status to G-4 aliens, solely on account of the G-4 alien’s federal
immigration status surely amounts to an ancillary burden . . . .”185 Similarly
here, Congress has not barred H1-B aliens from obtaining professional
licenses, but states are adopting laws that deny them this possibility based
solely on their immigration status.
It is not clear why the Fifth Circuit was so focused on the issue of
transience. The analogy is simply that states are interfering with federal
immigration policy by putting up barriers to nonimmigrants that Congress
did not adopt. Even if transience was an important distinguishing factor,
the argument is undermined by Toll’s alternative holding that the Maryland
policy presented an impermissible obstacle by interfering with the financial
incentives Congress was offering to G-4 visa holders through its tax
exemption policy.186 That holding had nothing to do with the transience of
the plaintiffs, and focused merely on the meddlesome nature of the state
program. Given the economic benefits of allowing skilled workers into the
United States, state licensure bans that inhibit their entrance meddle with
Congressional goals, just as Maryland’s discriminatory tuition policy did.
The Second Circuit was correct in pointing out that the hedging
language the Court adopted is not a rule, and that in any case, Congress has
done more than simply allow nonimmigrants to enter the country. State
laws that prevent nonimmigrant aliens from obtaining professional licenses
as a class represent an unconstitutional interference with federal
immigration regulations.
CONCLUSION
While there may be a valid debate about the proper role of skilled
guest workers in the United States economy, the place for that debate is in
Washington, not state legislatures. The equal protection clause protects
skilled guest workers against the passions and prejudices of a political
system in which they are not allowed to participate, in spite of their
substantial contributions to our economic growth.

184. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1982).
185. Id. at 14.
186. Id. at 16.
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Leaving immigration regulations to the federal government means that
we will continue to present ourselves to the world as one country, with one
door. When a national consensus is achieved, states should not attempt to
undermine that effort by adopting laws that conflict with Congressional
goals. Allowing state licensure bans that affect skilled guest workers opens
the door to a patchwork system of immigration policies that will interfere
with American businesses.
In light of the split amongst the Circuit Courts on both the equal
protection and preemption issues, it might be wise for members of
Congress to consider adopting an express preemption clause prohibiting
states from adopting licensure bans that apply to skilled guest workers
based on their immigration status alone, as opposed to a more
individualized assessment that includes their skills, training and ties to the
state. Such a move would cement the hard work members of Congress are
putting in to achieve a consensus on immigration reform legislation. While
legal analysis shows that state level attempts to undermine that consensus
are unlikely to succeed, such a provision would make it a more open and
shut case.

